Land & Water Law Review
Volume 34

Issue 1

Article 11

1999

Civil Rights - The Status of Persons Infected with Asympotomatic
HIV under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 after
Bragdon - Did the Supreme Court Miss an Opportunity to Protect
Disabled Americans - Bragdon v. Abbott
Robert C. Mathes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Mathes, Robert C. (1999) "Civil Rights - The Status of Persons Infected with Asympotomatic HIV under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 after Bragdon - Did the Supreme Court Miss an Opportunity to
Protect Disabled Americans - Bragdon v. Abbott," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 34 : Iss. 1 , pp. 237 - 261.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol34/iss1/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Mathes: Civil Rights - The Status of Persons Infected with Asympotomatic

CIVIL RIGHTS-The Status of Persons Infected with
IV Under the Americans with
Asymptomatic
Disabilities Act of 1990 After Bragdon-Did the
Supreme Court Miss an Opportunity to Protect Disabled
Americans? Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1196 (1998).
INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)' is a sweeping
piece of legislation that seeks to eliminate discrimination against the mil-

lions of disabled Americans.2 The ADA has protected disabled Americans
from discrimination in both private and public contexts.' Despite the ADA's
significance, the Supreme Court of the United States has 4only directly ad-

dressed or interpreted this historic statute on two occasions.

On September 16, 1994, Sidney Abbott entered the office of Dr. Randon Bragdon for a routine dental appointment.' Abbott disclosed that she

had been infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).' Although Abbott had been infected with HIV since 1986, at the time of her
appointment she had not yet begun to show any outward signs of the infection." Bragdon completed a dental examination, discovered a cavity, and
informed Abbott of his policy against filling cavities of HIV infected patients in his office.' Bragdon said he was willing to fill the cavity in a hospital, at no added fee for his services, if Abbott was willing to pay for the

additional cost of using the hospital's facilities., Abbott declined this offer.",
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). The stated purpose of the ADA is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
3. See infra notes 38-43.
4. See infra note 124.
5. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2200-01.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Bragdon "made no showing, however, that any area hospital had [the] safeguards [which he
believed would reduce the risk of HIV transmission] or even that he had hospital privileges." Id at 2211.
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Instead, Abbott filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Maine under the Maine Civil Rights Act" and section 302 of the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act.' 2 The federal statute prohibits discrimina-

tion in places of public accommodation such as a dentist's office. 3 Bragdon

justified his decision by suggesting that if the procedure were performed in
his office it would pose a "direct threat" to the health or safety of others,
thus invoking a statutory defense under the ADA."

After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment." The district court ruled in Abbott's favor, holding that her MV
infection satisfied the ADA's definition of disability."l The district court
also held that Bragdon raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Abbott's HIV infection posed a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.' 7 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Abbott's

asymptomatic [IV" was a disability under the ADA, and that Bragdon
could not demonstrate that Abbott's [IV status posed a direct threat to the

health or safety of others.' On November 26, 1997, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether asymptomatic [IV infection is a disability under the ADA and whether there was sufficient information to de-

termine, as a matter of law, that Abbott's HIV infection posed no direct
1I. The state law claims were not addressed by the U.S.

Supreme Court. See id. at 2201.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
13. The ADA provides that: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). The ADA defines the term public accommodation to include the "professional office of a health care provider." See id. § 12181(7)(F).
14. The ADA qualifies the mandate against discrimination by providers of public accommodation by
providing:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of others. The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
See id. § 12182(b)(3).
15. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at2201.
16. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580, 585-87 (D. Me. 1995).
17. Id at591.
18. Asymptomatic is defined as the lack of any outward symptoms caused by the HV infection. The
HIV virus attacks the body's immune system by invading and destroying CD4+ cells. A person is regarded as having AIDS when their CD4+ cell count falls below 200 cellslrmm' of blood. Bragdon, 118
S. Ct. at 2204.
19. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,943-48 (1st Cir. 1997). The court of appeals held that Abbott
was entitled to the protection of the ADA because her HIV infection met the Act's definition of a disability in that it was an impairment that substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction. The
court of appeals based it decision regarding the threat Abbott's HIV infection posed to Dr. Bragdon by
examining the Center for Disease Control's Recommended Infection Control Practices for Dentistry and
the American Dental Association's policies regarding the treatment of HIV and AIDS infected patients.
Id
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threat to the health or safety of others.20 In a five to four decision" the Court
affirmed the court of appeals' determination that asymptomatic HIV falls
within the defimition of disability under the ADA, 2 but vacated the summary
judgment in favor of Abbott and remanded the direct threat issue to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with the Court's
opinion.23
This case note examines the Bragdon decision's impact upon those
protected under the ADA. The note briefly discusses the history of the ADA
and the federal Rehabilitation Act and the applicable case law under those
statutes. The note then focuses on the majority and dissenting opinions in
the case, and critiques their reasoning. The note concludes by examining the
implications the Court's holding will have in future cases involving persons
infected with HIV and other debilitating diseases, and offers an alternate
method by which the Court could have decided the case.
BACKGROUND

The RehabilitationAct of 1973
As the immediate predecessor to the ADA, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act
serves as an important foundation to understanding the ADA. Congress first
protected "handicapped"'" persons by passing the Rehabilitation Act, 2
which prohibited discrimination against handicapped persons by any federal, or federally funded program or activity., The Rehabilitation Act defined as handicapped any person who: "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment."2' This definition was copied almost verbatim

20. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. CL 554 (1997) (order granting certiorai).
21. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in the decision. Id. at 2213. Justice
Ginsburg also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2213. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 2214. The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by
in full by Justices Scalia and Thomas and by Justice O'Connor in Part 11.Id. Justice O'Connor also filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part Id. at 2217.
22. 1d at2201-09.
23. Id. at 2213.
24. While the Rehabilitation Act used the term "handicapped," when drafting the ADA Congress
chose to use the currently preferred term of "disabled." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II) at 50-51 (1990)
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 332-333.
25. Pub. L. No. 93-112,87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994)).
26. Specifically the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination in government employment practices, 29 U.S.C. § 791(a) (1994), in the awarding of federal contracts, 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1994), or by
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1994).
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into the ADA's definition of a disability.15
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, every applicable judicial decision
found that asymptomatic HIV was a handicap covered by the Rehabilitation
Act." This case history is significant given the similarity between the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a "handicap" and the ADA's definition of a
"disability."' o
One of the most significant cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act
was the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County,
Floridav. Arline." In Arline a school teacher filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act after being fired because of her susceptibility to tuberculosis."
While the Supreme Court specifically declined to reach the question of
whether a person with AIDS, HIV, or other contagious disease is per se
disabled," the Court announced that an employer can refuse to employ a
person if doing so would prevent that person from being a direct threat to
the health or safety of others.' The Court also adopted a standard by which
the "threat" a person poses should be evaluated., This decision became the
foundation for the ADA's direct threat exception?'
The Americans with DisabilitiesAct.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is perhaps the most significant piece of civil rights legislation enacted within the last twenty-five
years.1 The ADA seeks to eliminate discrimination against the forty-three
million Americans who have one or more mental or physical disabilities.'
28. Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 2202. For the ADA's definition of a handicap see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)

(1994).
29. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing numerous cases in which an HIV infection was found to be a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act definition of a disability).
30. See id.
at 2202.

31. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 276.
Id.at 282, n.7.
Id at 287-89.
Id.
at 288. The Court adopted the following standard:

[The] inquiry should include [findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how
the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm.
Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 19,
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277)).
36. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2210 (1998).
37. LAURA F. ROTHSTEN, DISABILITES AND THE LAW § 1.05, 23 (2d. ed., West Group 1997). The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, is certainly an important piece of civil rights legislation,
however given the ADA's breadth and scope it is arguably a more important piece of legislation.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a-b) (1994).
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The ADA is divided into four subchapters addressing respectively: em-

ployment," public entities and services,4° providers of public accommoda-

tion and services," and other miscellaneous matters.' The first subchapter is

primarily enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and private plaintiffs," while the second and third subchapters are
enforced by the Department of Justice, and as in this case, by third party
plaintiffs."
Because it would have been impractical for the Congress to list, or to
have directed an administrative agency to list, all of the disabilities the ADA
was designed to cover, Congress reused the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of a handicap.'" The definition used by the ADA defines disability with respect to the individual," giving the courts the power to determine what constitutes a disability on a case by case basis. However, this lack of a clear
definition has led to considerable litigation and many judicial decisions
seeking to determine exactly which types of impairments are considered
disabilities under the ADA. One of the most widely litigated subjects under
the ADA is whether asymptomatic HIV is considered a disability.,'
Prior to Bragdon, the federal courts of appeals were split on whether
persons infected with HIV, who have not yet begun to show symptoms of
the infection, are protected by the ADA. The First and Ninth Circuits held
that asymptomatic HIV meets the definition of a disability as provided in
the statute.43 In fact, the First Circuit specifically held that asymptomatic

HIV is a disability because it substantially interferes with the major life
activity of reproduction.' 9

39. Seeid §§ 12111-12117.
40. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
41. See id. §§ 12181-12185.
42. See id. §§ 12201-12213.
43. See id. § 12117. The Department of Justice also has enforcement authority under this subchapter
of the ADA. See id. § 12117.
44. See id.
§§ 12133, 12188.
45. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 50-54 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 332-336.
46. A disability is defined by the ADA as: "with respect to an individual- (A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment" 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) (1994). This definition was taken directly from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
706(8)(A) (1994).
47. Michael D. Carlis & Scott A. McCabe, Are There No Per Se Disabilities Under The Americans
With Disabilities Act? The Fate ofAsymptomatic HIV Disease, 57 MD. L. REv. 558, 580 (1998) (citing
numerous cases in which federal courts have considered whether asymptomatic {IV is a disability [or
handicap] under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or the ADA).
48. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding asymptomatic HIV infected persons disabled, under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, because HIV is an infectious disease).
49. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939-43.
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This position was sharply disputed by the Fourth Circuit's holding that
asymptomatic HIV is not per se a disability as defined by the ADA." The
Fourth Circuit later held that reproduction is not a major life activity under
the ADA, and that even if it were, IV does not interfere with reproduction
or the activities associated with it."
Considering a separate but related issue, the Eighth Circuit found that

reproduction is not a major life activity under the ADA because reproduction is not consistent with the illustrative list of major life activities listed in
the EEOC's regulations issued in accordance with Subchapter one of the
ADA. 2 The Eighth Circuit held that it would be a "stretch of federal law" to

include reproduction in the list of major life activities." Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit held that asymptomatic HIV does not interfere with the major life
activity of reproduction and is therefore not covered under the ADA.:
The Department of Justice's regulations, promulgated pursuant to the

ADA, " offer a position contrary to the Fourth Circuit by including HV
within the disabilities covered by the ADA. 6 While the original regulations
did not specifically address asymptomatic HIV, the Department of Justice

amended its definition of a mental or physical impairment to include both
symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV following the above referenced decisions."

50. Ennis v. Nat'l. Assoc. of Bus. and Educ. Radio Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1997). Employee
charged that she was fired in violation of the ADA and claimed that her termination stemmed from her
employer's fear that her son's HIV infection would increase the company's insurance premium. The
Court held that since HIV was not a disability per se under the ADA, she failed to meet her prima facie
case. Id at 56-5 7, 60.
51. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 167-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane).
Employee filed suit claiming that he was terminated solely because he was infected with HIV. The Court
found that asymptomatic HIV is not an impairment under the ADA because there are no diminishing
effects upon the individual. Id at 676-77.
52. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1996)). These activities include such things as, "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." See id In Krauel, the Court held
that an employer's denial of insurance coverage for employee's fertility treatment did not violate the
ADA because infertility was not an impairment that substantially affected one of her major life activities.
Id. at 677.
53. Id.
54. Zatarain v. WDSU, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) affig memo 881 F.Supp. 240, 243 (E. D. La.
1995). Employee was fired because infertility treatments were interfering with her ability to perform her
job responsibilities. She filed suit under the ADA but the Court held that reproduction is not a "major
life activity" under the ADA. Id at 241-44.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994).
56. 28 C.F.R. 36.104(1)(iii) (1997).
57. Id.
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In Bragdon, the Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision that Abbott's asymptomatic HIV infection constituted a disability under the ADA, but vacated the circuit court's judgment regarding
the threat Abbott's HIV infection posed to Bragdon.'s The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion to "determine whether our analysis of some of the studies
cited by the parties would change its conclusion that petitioner presented
neither objective evidence nor a triable issue of fact on the question of
risk."' The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, dealt with only
two issues.- First, whether Abbott's HIV infection, while still in the outwardly asymptomatic stage, constituted a disability under the ADA, and
second, whether the First Circuit cited sufficient information to conclude as
a matter of law that Abbott's HIV infection did not pose a direct threat to
the health and safety of others .61
HIV as a Disability.
The Court first examined whether Abbott's HIV infection met the requirements under the ADA's definition of a disability. A disability is defined by the ADA as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."62 The ADA requires the inquiry to be made on an individual basis examining closely the facts in each case.61 The Court determined that
asymptomatic HIV is an impairment under the ADA because of the way the
HIV retrovirus attacks the body's immune system once it enters the body."
The Court held that "in light of the immediacy with which the virus begins
to damage the infected person's white blood cells and the severity of the
disease ...[asymptomatic IV] is an impairment from the moment of infection."6

58. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2212 (1998).
59. Id.

60. The Supreme Court actually granted certiorari on three issues: 1) Is reproduction a major life
activity within the meaning of the ADA?, 2) Are asymptomatic persons infected with HIV disabled
within the meaning of the ADA?, 3) Whether petitioner cited sufficient evidence to avoid summary
judgment regarding the risk posed by performing a routine dental procedure on a person infected with
HIV? Id.at 554. However, the Court only addressed the first two questions. Id. at 2200.

61. Id at 2200.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
63. See id. The definition of a disability under the ADA begins with the phrase "with respect to an

individual." See id
64. Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 2200.
65. Id
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The Court next addressed whether reproduction constitutes a major life
activity under the ADA. The Court noted the possibility that HIV infections
could affect a wide variety of "major life activities," but since reproduction
was the activity addressed by the court of appeals, the Court did not address
other "major life activities" that might be substantially limited by the disease.6 The Court "[had] little difficulty" determining that reproduction is a
"major life activity."' The Court first examined the words of the statute
itself: "The plain meaning of the word 'major' denotes comparative importance ...

[and] suggests that the touchstone for determining an activity's

inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance."" The Court then
found that "[rieproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.'
Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life
process itself."6 The Court denied Bragdon's claim that "major life activity"
applies only to those activities which have "a public, economic, or daily
character."" The ADA incorporated an illustrative list of major life activities originally issued by the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act." For this
reason, the Court compared reproduction to the EEOC's illustrative list of
major life activities." This list includes activities such as "caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working,'"' The Court held that Bragdon's claim regarding the economic or public nature of major life activities was not consistent
with the EEOC's illustrative list of major life activities and was therefore
invalid.',
The Court then addressed the final element in the ADA's definition of
disability: whether Abbott's impairment substantially limited a major life
activity. The Court found that Abbott's HIV infection substantially limited
her major life activity of reproduction in two separate ways." The Court
found that Abbott's major life activity of reproduction was limited because
of the risk a woman infected with HIV poses to a man while trying to conceive a child via intercourse. 76 The Court also noted that there is roughly a
twenty-five percent chance of transmitting the disease to a child during

66. Id. at 2205.
67- Id.
68. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,939-40 (1st Cir. 1997)).
69. See id
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
72. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
73. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997).
74. Bragdon, 118 S.Ct.at2205.
75. Id. at 2206.
76. Id. The Court cites numerous studies indicating that males have between a twenty and twentyfive percent chance of becoming infected with the disease when having unprotected intercourse with an
infected woman. Id.
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pregnancy." This risk can be mitigated by use of an antiretroviral therapy to
approximately an eight percent chance, but as a matter of law, the risk poses
a substantial limitation on reproduction." The Court concluded that "the
disability definition does not turn on personal choice. When significant
limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable.' 9
The Court's holding is supported by the majority of administrative
interpretations of "disability" from before and after the ADA was enacted.20
The Court used as additional support the 1988 opinion issued by the Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC)." The OLC's opinion
concluded that both symptomatic and asymptomatic I-IV infected persons
met the requirements listed in the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap, because an HIV infection substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction." The Court noted, as further support for this view, the fact
that every applicable judicial decision under the Rehabilitation Act held that
asymptomatic HIV satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicap." When Congress copied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap
for the ADA's definition of disability, it was an indication that the ADA's
"disability" should be seen as essentially the same as the Rehabilitation
Act's "handicap."'" Finally, the Court cited the regulations promulgated by
the Department of Justice under Subchapter three of the ADA.'" The Department of Justice's regulations are consistent with the Court's view and
list both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infections as disabilities under
the ADA. 6
The Direct Threat Issue.
Bragdon, like any medical professional required to provide treatment
under the ADA, could have legally refused to treat Abbott if her HIV infection posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 7 The ADA defines a direct threat as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 2207.
81. 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, Kimec Memo (Sept. 27, 1988).
82. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207 (citing 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264,273 Kimec Memo (Sept. 27,
1988)).
83. See id. at 2208.
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12186(b), 12206(c), 12188(b).
86. 28 CFR § 36.104(1)(iii) (1997).
87. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994)). This exception to the

service requirement is available to any provider of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3)
(1994).
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cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services."" The direct threat caveat is
based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the 1988 Arline case.9 The risk
posed to others must be assessed from the standpoint of the person refusing
the treatment or accommodation, and must be based upon reasonable medical evidence."
The Court stated "[flor the most part, the [First Circuit] Court of Appeals followed the proper standard in evaluating the Petitioner's [Bragdon's] position and conducted a thorough review of the evidence."9" However, the Court questioned the court of appeals' reliance upon the Center for
Disease Control Dentistry Guidelines and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on HIV. 2 Since the court of appeals did not have briefs and
arguments presented solely on whether Abbott's infection posed a direct
threat to the health or safety of others during routine dental procedures, the
Supreme Court found that the court of appeals did not have sufficient information upon which to base its rulingY The Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the First Circuit Court of Appeals to "determine
whether our analysis of some of the studies cited by the parties would
change its conclusion that Petitioner [Bragdon] presented neither objective
evidence nor a triable issue of fact on the question of risk."'"
ConcurringOpinions.
Two short concurring opinions were filed in this case. The first, written
by Justice Stevens, and joined by Justice Breyer, demonstrated the difficulty
the Court had in creating a majority opinion in this case. Justice Stevens'
concurrence stated that he believed summary judgment was properly
granted on the issue of risk and would have preferred to affirm the court of
appeals' decision outright, but he joined Justice Kennedy's opinion in order
to create a majority.9
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion praising the Court's decision to remand the case to the First Circuit.m Justice Ginsburg recommended
"erring on the side of caution" to ensure "a fully informed determination

88.
89.
90.
(1987);
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288
28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1997)).
See id.
Id.at2211.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2213 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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whether Abbott's disease posed 'a significant risk to the health and safety'
of [Bragdon] that [could not] be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures."" Justice Ginsberg also indicated that she believed
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA when a person is "perceived" as being disabled." This statement could be seen as an invitation for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that asymptomatic HIV also meets the "regarded as
disabled" prong of the ADA's definition of a disability.
The Opinions Concurringin the Judgment in Partand Dissentingin Part.
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part." The Chief Justice concurred with the Court's
holding that the case should be remanded to the First Circuit to determine
whether Abbott's condition posed a direct threat to the health or safety of
others, but disagreed with the Court's conclusion that asymptomatic HIV
constitutes a disability under the ADA.1"' Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
was joined in full by Justices Scalia and Thomas.-1° Justice O'Connor joined
the Chief Justice's opinion regarding the "direct threat" provision, but wrote
separately to discuss her reasons for concluding that asymptomatic HIV is
not a disability under the ADA. 2
In order to reach his conclusion that asymptomatic HIV does not fall
within the ADA's definition of disability, the Chief Justice analyzed the
ADA's definition and focused on the importance of an individual inquiry in
this case because the matter was dismissed on summary judgment by the
district court.' 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist first suggested that Abbott must
demonstrate that her asymptomatic HV infection meets all three parts of
the ADA's definition of disability."'° In other words, Abbott would have had
to demonstrate that her HIV infection substantially limited her major life
activity of reproduction. Bragdon did not dispute that HIV was an impairment under the ADA, and for this reason the Chief Justice moved on to the
second requirement., ' Because the record contained no evidence that Abbott
wanted to reproduce before becoming infected with HIV,"0' the Chief Justice
stated that it could not accurately be said that her major life activity of re-

97. Id. at 2214 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994)) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
98. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994)) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 2214-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 2217-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 2214-16 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
105. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
106. See id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part).
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production had been substantially limited in any way.10' The Chief Justice
claimed that because Abbott failed to demonstrate that her major life activity had been limited in this regard, the Court should not have decided that
asymptomatic HIV constitutes a disability, in this case, under the ADA. 0'
After making this direct attack on Abbott's case, the Chief Justice criticized the Court's holding in a more general manner. The Chief Justice suggested that the Court was "simply wrong in concluding as a general matter
that reproduction is a 'major life activity." ' '" The Chief Justice argued that
reproduction is not a "major life activity" in the same sense as those activities contained in the guidelines under the Rehabilitation Act, and incorporated by reference into the ADA."' The dissent also claimed that the Court
incorrectly relied upon Webster's first definition of "major," stressing relative importance, and should have focused instead on the second definition
stressing "quantity, number, or extent.""' The Chief Justice acknowledged
that "reproductive decisions are important in a person's life," but he denied
that they are "major life activities.""'
The dissent then proposed that asymptomatic HIV does not substantially limit Abbott's major life activity of reproduction." The record indicated that "those [infected with HIIV] are still entirely able to engage in sexual intercourse, give birth to a child if they become pregnant, and perform
the manual tasks necessary to rear a child to maturity.""' The Chief Justice
suggested that reproduction is still a matter of choice despite the limitations
that HIV infection imposes."' The Chief Justice concluded this section of
his opinion stating that the "Respondent's [Abbott's] argument, taken to its
logical extreme, would render every individual with a genetic marker for
some debilitating
disease 'disabled' here and now because of some possible
'6
future effects."'

In the second part of his opinion the Chief Justice addressed the direct
threat issue."' The Chief Justice agreed with the way the Court defined and
107. Id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part)
108. Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id.The regulations issued by the EEOC under the Rehabilitation act were incorporated into the
ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). See supranote 68 and accompanying text.
111. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
112. See id.(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 702 (10th ed. 1994)).
113. See id.
at 2215-16 (Rehnquist, C.T., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id.(Rehnquist, C., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brief for
the Petitioner at 53-54, Abbot v. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (No. 97-156) (1998.)).
at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.I., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
115. See id.
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
117. ld. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
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addressed the direct threat issue, but questioned why the Court gave the
scientific opinion of a public health official more credence than other scientific opinions."- The Chief Justice suggested that each opinion should be
evaluated on its own merits and the Court should not merely "defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."'19 With these principles in mind the Chief Justice suggested that Bragdon presented more than
enough information to avoid summary judgment on the direct threat question.",
Justice O'Connor filed a short opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part."' In her opinion she criticized the Court's ruling
that Abbott's HIV status substantially limited one or more of her major life
activities.'" Justice O'Connor stated that "the act of giving birth to a child,
while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the
same as the representative major life activities of all persons."'"
ANALYSIS

Bragdon was the Court's first major decision under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.'" It was also the first time the Supreme Court directly addressed HIV and AIDS since the AIDS epidemic began nearly 18 years

ago.'" In Bragdon, the Court was primarily concerned with the interpretation of the ADA rather than its constitutionality.-u For these reasons, inter
alia,a clear understanding of the Bragdon decision will be important for a
comprehensive understanding of the ADA.

at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id.
(quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.1 (1987)).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment inpart and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id.
124. Joan Biskupic & Amy Goldstein, Disability Law Covers HIV, Justices Rule, 5-4 Decision ProThose Not Having AIDS, THlE WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 1998, at Al. On June 15, 1998, ten
tects
days before Bragdon was decided, the Supreme Court held that Subchapter 11of the ADA, the public
entity section, applies to state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952,
1954-55 (1998). While the Supreme Court first addressed the ADA in Yeskey, the Bragdon decision is
arguably more important. The Court's decision in Yeskey clarified the extent to which the ADA applies
to public entities, but does not have the breadth or significance of the Court's decision in Bragdon.
125. Biskupic & Goldstein, supra note 124 at Al. The Supreme Court has rarely addressed cases in
which HV or AIDS is an issue. In all of the following eases HIV or AIDS was mentioned but not the
primary focus of the case: Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, (1994); American Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489
U.S. 46 (1989); School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
126. The constitutional challenges to the ADA at the district court level, Abbott v.Bragdon, 912
F.Supp. 580, 592-96 (D. Me. 1995), were not considered by the Supreme Court. Further, when determining if reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA the Court did not mention or discuss the
"right of procreation" developed under the Fourteenth Amendment in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-56 (1972).
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The Bragdon decision will play a crucial role in the history of the ADA
for at least two important reasons. First, Bragdon resolved the conflict
among the circuits regarding the status of persons with asymptomatic HIV.
Second, Bragdon will play an important role in the history of the ADA because the decision has further defined and clarified the types of disabilities
that are to be protected. However, given the importance of the ADA and the
role it plays in protecting "disabled" persons from discrimination, it is possible the Court's decision in Bragdon has not done as much as it could have
to clarify the ADA's definition of disability. It is unfortunate that the Court
missed an opportunity to announce a more tenable interpretation of the
ADA.
The Americans with Disabilities Act should be applied so that persons
infected with HIV, whether they are symptomatic or asymptomatic, are
protected by the ADA. HIV infection is a debilitating disease that affects
every facet of the lives of those who become infected. As many as one million Americans may be infected with the HIV virus,"'2 demonstrating the
need for a tenable rule of law on this issue. It is clear from the legislative
history that Congress intended for persons infected with HIV, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic, to be covered under the ADA. 2
The Court'sAnalysis of the ADA 's Definition ofa Disability.
Congress failed to list, or direct an administrative agency to list, all the
disabilities protected by the ADA, nor did Congress choose to define carefilly each word in the ADA's definition of "disability.",', This has forced
courts to determine which conditions are protected under the ADA on a case
by case basis. Congress very clearly intended ADA protection to extend to
those who are in a risk category for discrimination due to some impairment
such as blindness, deafness, or paraplegia.- ° In this regard, the ADA has
been very successful in protecting the forty-three million Americans that the
ADA covered before Bragdon.1'1 However, the vague wording of the ADA

127. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Abbot v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1996)(No. 976156).
128. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; S.REP.
No. 101-116, at 22 (1990). This conclusion is supported by remarks made by members of Congress
during debates regarding the ADA. 136 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep.

Owens); 136 Cong. Rec. 1-14626 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman); 136 Cong. Rec.
11,453 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermont); 135 Cong. Rec. 19,867 (daily ed. Sept.

7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
129. Like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, rather than listing all of the disabilities that are protected
under the ADA, the ADA definer a disability. See supra note 46. Further, the regulations issued under
the ADA by the DOJ define a disability in the same way, but provide an illustrative list of impairments
which meet the ADA's definition. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1997).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (1997).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
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has forced the courts to further define the term "disability" in order to determine which "impaired" persons are covered by the ADA.
1. Reliance upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The Court recognized Congress's clear intent that the Rehabilitation
Act should frame any discussion of the ADA.'32 This recognition was based
on the language of the statute stating that nothing in the ADA should diminish the protections created by the Rehabilitation Act.'33 In addition, Congress's intent is illustrated by the incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of "handicap" for the ADA's definition of "disability."", For
these reasons, the Court recognized the importance of the Rehabilitation
Act's case law in determining which impaired individuals the ADA protects
from discrimination. 3 ' This precedent was significant because every case
brought before the enactment of the ADA found that asymptomatic HIV
met the statutory definition of "handicap.' 36 The dissent's refusal to acknowledge the significance of this precedent is disturbing because it ignores
Congress's command to consider Rehabilitation Act case law when interpreting the ADA.
2. The Court's Decision and its Difficulties.
The ADA's definition of a disability, taken almost verbatim from the
Rehabilitation Act,' 7 has three distinct prongs. An individual is considered
disabled under the ADA if: (1) they have an actual impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, (2) they have a record of such impairment or (3) they are regarded as having such an impairment.' The majority
of courts have attempted, as did the Supreme Court in this case, to force
asymptomatic HIV infection into the first prong of the ADA's definition.' 9
Dr. Bragdon conceded that I-HV is an impairment under the AbA, and
the dissent did not address the issue,'" so the Court's holding that HIV was

132. Bragdon v. Abbott 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998).

133. The ADA provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title" 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
134. See supra note 46.
135. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208.
136. Id.

137. See supra note 46.
138. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
139. Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New Social
Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 20-26 (1997).

140. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). The Chief Justice did not address whether HIV is an impairment since the petitioner did not
dispute that asymptomatic HIV is an impairment under the ADA. Id.
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an impairment probably had two related purposes. First, the Court was responding to the Fourth Circuit's holding that asymptomatic HIV is not an
impairment under the ADA,"' and second, the Court was attempting to
clarify that in order to meet the statutory definition, impairments only have
2
to be present, not necessarily outwardly detectable.1
a. Difficulties With The Court's Interpretation.
The Court's analysis of a disability under the ADA is problematic for
several reasons. The Court concluded that because of the relative importance of reproduction, it qualifies as a "major life activity" under the
ADA.' The Court reached this conclusion by examining the plain meaning
of the term "major.'"- By relying upon Webster's Collegiate Dictionary's
first definition of "major," the Court decided that "major" refers to a qualitative evaluation of the activity and held "the plain meaning of the word
'major' indicates comparative importance.""' However, the Court provided
no reason for selecting the qualitative rather than quantitative use of the
word "major." The Court simply states that this test should be applied.
The Court then asserted that reproduction, like the activities listed in
the EEOC guidelines, is of great qualitative importance in a person's life.'
This list includes such activities as "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.""7 Reproduction does not seem to fit well with the list of illustrative major life activities issued by the EEOC. All of these activities are certainly qualitatively important, but they are nothing like reproduction. Decisions to reproduce are usually conscious lifestyle choices based on many
factors and considerations including age, health, economics, and religious
beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to the EEOC's representative list of major
life activities, which are not lifestyle choices, but are conditions necessary
to live and function normally within society on a daily basis. The inability
to hear, work, or learn cannot and should not be compared to the ability to
reproduce. Further, the use of the qualitative standard in conjunction with

141. The Fourth Circuit held that asymptomatic HIV is not an impairment under the ADA because the
definition of an impairment requires the individual to be lessened and, "without [outwardly visible]
symptoms, there are no diminishing effects on the individual." Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123
F.3d 156, 168 (4th Cir. 1997) (en bane).
142. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. The Court discusses the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare's regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(1), which do not require the
impairment to be outwardly detectable. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
143. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 93940 (lst Cir. 1997).
146. See id.

147. Issued under the Rehabilitation Act at 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (1997), incorporated into the
ADA at42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
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the Court's disregard for the illustrative list of major life activities can be
seen as an invitation by the Court for future litigation regarding the status of
other qualitatively important activities such as marriage, occupation, and
choosing where to live. "'
People with outwardly detectable disabilities like those listed in the
EEOC's guidelines are often subject to discrimination because they are set
aside from the rest of society.' 9 To say that persons who are unable to reproduce are treated similarly is a tenuous argument. After all, the decision
to reproduce is primarily a private matter, unknown to members of the general public. This privacy makes discrimination solely on the grounds of reproductive ability unlikely.
The dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that the Court's qualitative approach is not sufficient and instead suggests that a quantitative approach be used to evaluate major life activities.'o Like the majority, the
Chief Justice offers no support for his position other than the quantitative
definition of "major." The dissent's approach seems far too narrow when
compared to the illustrative list of major life activities in the EEOC's
guidelines. Activities such as seeing, breathing, and working have both
quantitative and qualitative importance. To rely solely on the quantitative
importance of an activity seems insufficient for determining whether that
activity is a "major life activity" under the ADA.
Neither the Court's nor the dissent's approach to determining what
types of activities can be classified as major life activities under the ADA
appears to be adequate. In order to most accurately determine what activities should and should not be termed "major life activities" under the
ADA's definition of disability, both the quantitative and qualitative approaches should be used. By doing so, courts would be able to draw from
the strengths and advantages of both the qualitative and quantitative approaches to determine which "major life activities" should be included
within the ADA's definition of a disability.
b. Potential Future Difficulties.
Under the Court's ruling, the protection of the ADA has perhaps been
unnecessarily extended to persons who, unlike Abbott, are not in need of the
statute's protection. The Court's interpretation of a disability may allow

148. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215.

149. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). It was to prevent this type of discrimination that Congress enacted
the ADA. Id. at § 12101(b).
150. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

in part).
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men who are sterile, impotent, extremely obese to the point that reproduction is physically impossible, or otherwise unable to reproduce, to fall
within the protection of the ADA. The same may be true of women who are
infertile, or otherwise unable to reproduce. Such individuals might meet the
Court's interpretation of the ADA's definition of a disability in that they
have an impairment which substantially limits their major life activity of
reproduction, despite the fact that they are otherwise able to function normally in society in every other way. This may create significant negative
results, including more litigation by private plaintiffs and an increased
workload for the courts, the EEOC, and the DOJ.",
The Court's decision may make it possible for persons with certain
genetic predispositions towards diseases to seek protection under the
ADA.5 2 In the very near future employers and insurance companies may use
genetic screening to identify those individuals who could be genetically
predisposed to certain diseases.'" The high cost associated with many genetically related diseases may force employers and insurance companies to
deny employment or insurance coverage to persons with genetic predispositions to certain diseases.-" This event might cause the courts to view genetic
dispositions as "impairments" under the ADA. Just as the Court held that
HIV is a disability because of the limitations it places on reproduction,
courts could now begin to consider genetic diseases as disabilities in much
the same manner.
In addition, with its decision in Bragdon, the Court may have actually
created inconsistencies in the ADA's protection of asymptomatic HIVinfected individuals. The holding that asymptomatic WV-infected persons
are disabled because of limitations on their ability to reproduce could be
construed to protect only those asymptomatic HIV infected persons who are
otherwise reproductively capable. Those asymptomatic HIV infected persons with other limitations on their major life activity of reproduction (infertility, sterility etc.) may not be covered by the ADA protections. For example, a woman with HJV who was infertile may not be considered disabled because the HIV infection would not actually limit her ability to reproduce. Similarly, asymptomatic HIV infected children who have not yet
reached puberty might not be protected by the ADA because they would not

151. Assuming that these federal agencies respond to, and investigate, this type of an alleged violation
of the ADA.

152. The view that Huntington's Disease should be considered a genetic disability was recently advocated by one commentator. See Brian R. Ginn, Note, Genetic Discrimination:Huntington's Disease and
the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406 (1998).

153. The ADA allows for a medical test of a potential employee after a conditional offer of employment has been given. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
154. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New

Technology, 74 B.U. L. REv. I, 10 (1994).
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yet be capable of reproduction. These types of distinctions are inconsistent
with Congress's clear intent that all persons infected with HIV be protected
under the ADA."'
Because the ADA requires the disability to be "with respect to an individual,""' 6 some courts may be unwilling to extend the protection of the
ADA to asymptomatic HIV-infected homosexuals because they may be
unable to demonstrate that their decision not to reproduce has been affected
in any way by their HIV status.' While decisions regarding reproduction
are in no way limited to heterosexuals, it may be more difficult for homosexuals to demonstrate their intentions to reproduce. In trying to limit discrimination, the Court may have actually created another method of discrimination.
The exceptions discussed above are inconsistent with the ADA itself
and civil rights legislation as a whole. Clearly, Congress intended to include
all HIV-infected individuals within the statute's reach,"' yet because of the
Court's application of the actual disability prong, large classes of HIV infected individuals could remain unprotected by the ADA. The difficulties
with the Court's interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability would,
of course, be limited by the fact that persons with the above limitations
could attempt to demonstrate that they are covered by the ADA for reasons
other than their inability to reproduce. These examples are included because
they demonstrate the potential inconsistencies that could result from the
Court's decision.
The Direct ThreatIssue
Despite the protection the ADA provides for individuals meeting the
ADA's definition of disability, Dr. Bragdon could have refused to treat Abbott if he could have demonstrated that her infectious condition "posed a
direct threat to the health or safety of others."" It is possible the direct
threat provision could be used, as it may have been used in this case, to discriminate against certain individuals because of prejudices associated with

155. See supranote 128 and accompanying text.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
157. The ADA clearly states that the protections of the ADA are not to be extended solely on the basis
of homosexuality or bisexuality. 42 U.S.C. § 1221 l(a) (1994).
158. See supra note 128.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994). The ADA defines a "direct threat" to be a "significant risk to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Id This provision stems from the Supreme
Court's recognition in School Bd. Of Naussau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987), of the importance of prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities while protecting others from
significant health and safety risks, resulting, for instance, from a contagious disease. Bragdon v. Abbott,
118 S. Ct. 2196, 2210 (1998).
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their conditions. The fact that Dr. Bragdon claimed to be willing to treat
Abbott in a hospital, but lacked hospital privileges at any local hospital,
could be seen as an example of this type of discrimination.
The Court remanded the determination of whether the dental procedure
constituted a direct threat to Dr. Bragdon. The majority concluded that the
medical opinions of public health officials should be given their due deference.'6" Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized this position and stated, "I am
aware of no provision of law or judicial practice that would require or permit courts to give some scientific views more credence than others simply
because they have been endorsed by a politically appointed public health
authority."' '

While any evidence of actual biases of the source should be taken into
consideration when determining the scientific merit of the evidence, all scientific opinions should be evaluated on the basis of their scientific merit and
application of the facts to the case, regardless of their source."'2 There is no
reason that the views of public health officials should be treated as more or
less impartial and scientifically correct than the views and scientific opinions of private entities simply because they have been developed and/or
endorsed by persons on the public payroll. Courts should evaluate evidence
presented based on the validity of the evidence alone.
Impacts of the Court'sDecision.
The first and most likely impact of the Court's decision will be an increase in litigation regarding what types of impairments meet the ADA's
definition of disability.'-3 By adopting the qualitative test to determine which
activities are "major life activities" under the ADA, the Court has opened up
the possibility for more litigation regarding other qualitatively important life
activities such as "who to marry, where to live, and how to earn one's living."'" Surely many plaintiff's attorneys will cite Bragdon as support for the
inclusion of diseases and conditions that had not previously been thought to
be covered by the ADA.'6
Approximately thirty-seven percent of all reported HIV discrimination
160. Bragdon, 188 S. Ct. at 2211. Justice Kennedy stated:that "[tihe views of public health authorities

.. are of special weight and authority." Id.
161. Id. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
162. However, the source of the evidence should be considered in those cases where a clear bias can
be demonstrated or accurately assumed.
163. Eric D. Randall, HIVinfection Covered by ADA, 1998 No. 7 ADAUP 25, 1 (1998).
164. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
165. Jonathan R. Mook, Ruling that HIV is a DisabilityCould Open Pandora'sBox ofADA Claims, 6
No. 4 EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST 1 (August, 1998).
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complaints occur in the workplace.'" Given the pervasive nature of reported
HIV discrimination in the workplace, the Bragdon decision will have a significant impact upon private employers. The Bragdon decision will affect
the implementation of private employers' practices and policies concerning
employment and insurance. The Bragdon decision has made it more difficult for employers to determine who is covered by the ADA by requiring
them to recognize conditions that are not outwardly detectable. "[T]he Supreme Court's expansive view of the ADA's definition of 'disability' in
Bragdon may be seen as opening the proverbial Pandora's Box of claimed
to
ADA disabilities and as making it much more difficult for employers
6
determine who is and who is not covered by the statutory protections.'
The Court's ruling in Bragdon has created a potential conflict between
an employer's right to know whether an employee is covered by the ADA,
and the employee's legitimate right to privacy. Because the employer could
be held liable for violations of the ADA, it would seem the employer has the
right to know which members of his workforce are under the protection of
the ADA. This right is in direct conflict with the employee's legitimate right
to privacy concerning his or her own medical history.' The employee's
right to privacy is especially crucial regarding his or her IV status, given
the societal stigmas associated with HIV infections. 6 9 These stigmas include
fears of infection,- homosexuality, and intravenous drug use.' 7' Since the
employee must disclose his disability in order to be afforded the protections
of the ADA,' asymptomatic HIV infected persons face the difficult choice
of either disclosing their HV status, and facing the stigmas discussed
above, or not having the protection of the ADA.
Further, until the direct threat issue is addressed by the First Circuit,
employers, as well as public entities and providers of public accommodations, will be at a disadvantage when trying to develop standards by which
to evaluate whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety
of others. "[N]otwithstanding an employer's good-faith belief that a disabled employee would pose a direct threat, the employer may be secondguessed by a court based on information or evidence that an employer did
not even have.""'

166. ROBERT L. BURGDORF 3R., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 443 (1995).
167. Id.
168. KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY FORMS AND PROCEDURES § 5.50, at 259 (1988).

169. Id.at 260.
170. BURGDORF, supra note 166, at 443.
171. DECKER, supra note 168, at 260.
172. JAMES G. FRIERSON, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE To THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 47-48

(1992).
173. Mook, supra note 165, at 1.
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Finally, as a result of Bragdon the insurance costs of employers could
be increased. Because the Court included "[r]eproduction and the sexual
dynamics surrounding it" in the category of "major life activities,'"" employers may be forced to include infertility and sterility treatments in their
health insurance plans. This argument is supported by the fact that the
Court's decision calls into question the Fifth Circuit's holding that infertility
treatments are not protected under the ADA because reproduction is not a
"major life activity.'" It seems logical to conclude that employers could
now be responsible for providing infertility and sterility treatments in their
health insurance plans. This argument gains additional support from the
First Circuit's holding that financial limitations on insurance benefits paid
by an employer-administered health care plan to disabled persons on account of their disability constitutes a violation of Title I of the ADA.'76 In all
probability, the Court's holding will be quite problematic for private employers who provide their own insurance.
A Missed Opportunity.
The Bragdon decision provided some important new protections for
persons infected with asymptomatic HIV, but it is possible the Court has
created as many difficulties as it has solved. Given the potential unnecessary costs and detrimental inconsistencies under Bragdon, the Supreme
Court should have protected all persons infected with asymptomatic HIV
under the "regarded as disabled" prong of the ADA.'- This would have allowed the Court to protect those people with asymptomatic HTV based on
the way they are treated by others, rather than trying to place asymptomatic
I-IIV infected persons under the protection of the ADA by using the "actually disabled" prong"' of the ADA's definition of a disability."
The Majority did not address why the Court chose to ignore the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of disability. In his dissent, Chief

174. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998).
175. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 675, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); see also note 36.
176. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers' Ass'n. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 1994). The court of appeals held that a lifetime limit of $25,000 for benefits paid for AIDS
related illnesses, as compared to the $1,000,000 limit for other illnesses, was a violation of Tide I of the
ADA. Id. at 20.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994). Under this approach a person must demonstrate that they were
regarded as having an impairment which substantially limited one of their major life activities. See id. §
12102(2).
178. See id. § 12102(2)(A).
179. This argument was mentioned by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.
Ct. 2196, 2213-14 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and was argued in the alternative to the "actual
disability" argument by Abbott. Brief for the Respondent Sidney Abbott at 37-41, Abbot v. Bragdon,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (No. 97-156) (1998). This position, and many of the arguments discussed below were
recently advocated by Elizabeth C. Chambers, Note and Comment, Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability
Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 73 WASH. L. REV. 403 (1998).
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Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court chose not to examine the "regarded
as" approach because it had not been raised at the district court level, and
the circuit court chose not to address the issue.""° The Court could have examined such an approach, however, because it had been brought up in Abbot's brief to the Supreme Court."' Unfortunately, that Court chose not to
address this question, which would have led to a far more tenable standard
of evaluating how asymptomatic HV infected persons are protected under
the ADA. Essentially, courts could look at HIV infections in one of two
ways under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA."12
First, the Court could have protected all persons infected with FHV by
stating that all persons with HIV are regarded as being disabled because of
the way persons infected with the disease are treated by the public. Society's fear and general discomfort with the disease often manifests itself by
treating those infected with the disease as second-class citizens. The facts in
Bragdon itself seem to support this notion. While this approach would successfully protect persons like Abbott, and would be consistent with Congress's desire to protect all HV-infected persons,"' it is problematic for
several reasons. First, this broad approach is probably inconsistent with the
statute's mandate that the determination of a disability must be made "with
respect to an individual."," The plain language of the statute requires that
the issue of disability must be decided on an individual rather than classwide basis.'- Therefore, any form of a blanket protection is inconsistent
with the statute's clear direction. Second, as previously discussed, any form
of broad protection may unnecessarily extend the ADA into areas where it
is not needed. While Congress intended to protect those infected with I-V,
Congress did not wish to extend the protection of the ADA to those who
experience no discrimination. Certainly, if not all HV-infected persons are
being discriminated against there is no reason to unnecessarily extend the
ADA to reach those persons.
The Court should have held that the "regarded as" prong of the definition be applied to HIV-infected persons on a case-by-case basis. The courts
would then apply the ADA in only those cases where a person is discriminated against by an employer, a provider of public accommodation, or by a
public entity as a result of his or her condition. An HIV infected person
would not be disabled because of his or her impairment, but because of the

180. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 1196, 2214 n.1 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
181. See supra note 179.
182. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
183. See supra note 125.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
185. Id.
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way they were treated and "perceived" or "regarded by" employers, providers of public accommodation, or by public entities as a result of their impairment. By protecting HIV-infected persons under the "regarded as"
prong, the Court could have extended the protection of the ADA to all
situations where evidence of discrimination against those persons with HIV
could be demonstrated. In cases where an individual accuses an employer,
public official, or provider of public accommodations of discriminating
against a person based on his or her HIV infection, the court could simply
look at the facts in the case and determine if discrimination had, in fact,
occurred. The ADA's protections would be extended to all IlV-infected
persons who are disabled or regarded as disabled but only invoked when
actual discrimination is demonstrated. This approach seems to be more consistent with Congress's intent that all HIV-infected persons should be included within the ADA's protection. While Congress intended for HIVinfected persons to be protected by the "actual disability" prong of the
ADA,-6 the inconsistencies created by classifying reproduction as a "major
life activity" will lead to the exclusion of some HIV infected persons. This
seems to create a tension between Congress's intent and the results of the
Court's decision. By following Congress's intent to protect HIV individuals
under the "actual disability" prong, the Court cannot meet Congress's intent
to protect all HIV infected persons.
The use of the "regarded as" prong is also supported by the EEOC's
regulations under the ADA. The regulations already state that a person
qualifies under the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition if they
are discharged from a job in response to a rumor that they are HIVpositive."7 The regulations also support the idea that the "regarded as" prong
applies when other people misperceive an impairment as a disability. As an
example, consider the case of a potential employee with a severe cosmetic
disfigurement.' While the disfigurement may not actually affect a person's
ability to work, the way they are perceived by others may prove to be a disability.,"
Finally, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Arline supports the view that
HIV-infected individuals should be protected under the "regarded as" prong
of the definition of a disability. In Arline the Court held that although an
impairment itself may not substantially limit a major life activity, other persons' negative and discriminatory reactions to that impairment may raise the
impairment to the level of a disability. ' - "The Court recognized that by in186. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) (1997).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol34/iss1/11

24

Mathes: Civil Rights - The Status of Persons Infected with Asympotomatic
1999

CASE Nom

cluding the 'regarded as' prong in the disability definition, Congress intended to fight the effects of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions about disabled persons who may not actually be incapacitated.""
Given the Supreme Court's interpretations of the definition of "disability"
used in the ADA, it appears that the Court could have used the "regarded
as" prong as a far more effective way of protecting persons infected with
HIV. The Court could have avoided the difficulties and inconsistencies it
appears to create by stretching the actual disability prong of the ADA and
forcing HIV infections within it.
CONCLUSION

In Bragdon, the Court illustrated the importance of the ADA in preventing discrimination against disabled persons. The Supreme Court has
taken an important step in demonstrating that prejudice and fear should no
longer control the manner in which persons who are infected with asymptomatic HIV are treated. While the Court has probably invited future litigation by expanding the class of disabled persons, the Court fulfilled the clear
intent of Congress to protect persons infected with HIV from discrimination. The Court could have decided the case upon a different and perhaps
more tenable ground if the Court had used the "regarded as," rather than the
"actually disabled" prong of the ADA's definition of disability. This would
have simultaneously avoided the confusion about who, among the class of
HIV-infected individuals, are protected, and would not have extended ADA
protections to those with reproductive difficulties unrelated to HIV.
ROBERT C. MATHES

191. Chambers, supranote 179, at 428 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 279).
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